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Introduction
The purpose of the overall study is to investigate launching the Lunar or Mars space
transportation vehicles direct into low earth orbit, requiring no on-orbit assembly,
versus launching vehicles partially assembled and integrating them at either Space
station or an alternate node.
The issue to be investigated is operations' requirements at each block step of HLLV
capability. In principle, the greater size should reduce the number of operations on-
orbit. However, it is to be expected that the larger and, consequently, highly complex
HLLV's will have associated with them increasing degrees of required ground support
and operations, as well as increasing degrees of required built in redundancy and
end-to-end self-test. Reliability concerns will grow, since the complexity of the vehicle
and the rigors of the launch environment could make the probability of system failure
more likely.
The major division is between one large spacecraft direct-to-moon or direct-to-Mars
and any on-orbit assembly regardless of where on-orbit the assembly is done. Within
the on-orbit assembly option, the secondary question will be addressed as to what are
the issues that would drive toward the development of an alternative to Space Station
Freedom as the assembly node.
Assumptions
In developing the requirements for on-orbit assembly operations, with or without using
Space Station Freedom, the Option V content will be used. The requirements for
Option V Lunar IMLEO (LTV/LEV using the Aerobrake) are approximately 160 t, with 4
tanks of approximately 26 t per wet tank, plus the LEV of 32.2 t, and the LTV Core of
22.1 t.
The required Mars vehicle IMLEO depends on the exact mission, e.g. manned-
opposition (781 t), manned-conjunction (666 t), or cargo (581 t.)
The reference set of Earth-to-Orbit transportation options (appended as an attachment)
offers a range of LEO payloads starting from the current expendables up to 20 t for
Shuttle, through proposed Shuttle C at around 70 t to Hybrid Shuttle Derived Vehicles
at around 100 t up through 140 t for MHLLV/SDV-ALS/3 Booster ALS and on to
External Tank Derived configurations or 4 Booster ALS of near 200 t ending up at 225
t for the 3 ET Booster and ET 3rd Stage core.
It is worth observing here that the Saturn V had a 120 t capacity to 100 nm low earth
orbit, and that in the docking operations of LEM and CSM, an electrical umbilical was
the only utility interconnect
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Vehicle/Assembly Requirements Taxonomy
There exist some major option paths that help to organize the assessment of direct
launch vs. on-orbit (Space Station or other transportation node) assembly and
including manned vs. unmanned.
I. Direct Launch
The simplest over-all division applies to whether or not, and which SEI missions could
be supported by a single, direct-launch vehicle.Since the total IMLEO for the Lunar
vehicles is 160 t, with a slight reduction for the cargo configuration, it can be seen that
none of the Shuttle derived vehicles or ALS options could support the LTV/LEV. Since
LTV/LEV baseline uses Aerobraking, other, all propulsive approaches to this vehicle
would require even larger ETO. Only the Option "External Tank Core with triple
External Tank Booster" or larger variants could support the LTV/LEV required IMLEO.
It should be noted that the bulk of LTV/LEV IMLEO comes from propellant, and even
significant modifications to the vehicle design will not impact this dominant fact.
For the Mars vehicles, there are no ETO systems proposed that can support any of the
vehicles for direct launch.
However, it is important to note that the transfer of some important payload to the Moon
and Mars could be done with expendable vehicles. For example, the Option 1
Manifest calls for robotic off-loaders and hab. modules in the 10 t range as the bulk of
the earlier cargo flights. It is also true that individual elements of the LTV/LEV or
MTV/MEV could be carried intact by several ETO options, but assembly would be
required which is excluded in this option.
II. Pieces in Orbit
All the next options in the taxonomy represent a quantum jump from the direct launch
option. Assembly on-orbit requires, by definition here, a transportation node. A
transportation node can be nothing more than a rendezvous point or it can be a real
physical facility, more or less complicated, dedicated to just assembly and operations
or multipurpose, such as the Space Station.
Available supporting resources on-orbit vary from none at a rendezvous point to IVA
and EVA astronauts plus teleoperation and robotics, simple repair equipment, ORU's,
power, sensors, thermal, mechanical/structural, etc., at a man-tended or permanently
manned physical transportation node or Space Station Freedom.
Pieces in orbit imply varying degrees of required support equipment and facilities on
orbit, a greater amount of on-orbit subsystem/system verification support, a
sophistication in ORU concept, design, and logistics philosophy and high confidence
in on-orbit operations.
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By way of compensation, there is a lessening of required direct ground end-to-end
verification, many more options for ETO approaches, including international and
commercial, the possibility of constructive intervention, a mix of non-man rated cargo
vehicles transporting man-rated components, etc.
II.A--Large Pieces
It is clear that if the LTV/LEV and MTV/MEV are in small enough pieces, they can be
brought up to the transportation node for assembly into the required vehicle. Thus, as
is shown in the attached listing of Lunar and Mars vehicle constituent subelements, the
largest MTV/MEV element is the 33 t Mars Transfer Crew Module & Equipment, while
for the LTV/LEV the largest element is 15 t.
As far as the capacity of ETO systems to bring these elements to orbit is concerned,
virtually any of the proposed Shuttle derived vehicles will be sufficient. Perhaps even
current expendables (ELV's) and Shuttle itself would suffice. Nevertheless, current
NSTS or ELV capabilities will not support the current Option I (Option V) as stated.
II.B--Small Pieces
The case of small pieces is one in which the LTV/LEV or MTV/MEV is assembled from
small elements. In this scenario, current launch vehicles would be sufficient to launch
virtually everything needed. Via EVA/IVA plus robotics or teleoperation, in a mix or
match, the LTV/LEV or MTV/MEV would be assembled. Obviously, this approach
would be a major challenge for EVA/IVA and telerobotics, and would require a
massive effort in ORU technology and an aggressive, enforced commonality program
policy. In addition, techniques for augmenting man's capabilities from the ground
would be required.
On the plus side, the ETO options would increase dramatically to the maximum level.
Many simple orbit-on-demand options, replete with multiple combinations would be
available for logistical support. While on-orbit operations would be expensive cost-to-
orbit, especially initial cost could be expected to be greatly reduced.
Required Operations
Class I.-Direct Launch
Since it has been pointed out that direct launch of the Option V (or Option I) LTV/LEV
or the MTV/MEV would not be possible with this option, it is necessary to consider only
the expendables in direct launch. Since most current and simple development
expendables have small capacity to Lunar surface and smaller capacity to Mars, some
on-orbit assembly of expendables would provide the ability to bring to the Lunar
surface larger elements of the human support infrastructure. The negative impact of
this approach is the required assembly at the transportation node of the vehicle.
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The vehicles to be assembled would be very few since the interconnection of a very
few major elements would be sufficient to carry all the necessary large surface
systems. Moreover, the vehicles assembled would not be man-rated and hence the
verification of the final vehicle would be the least severe.
Assembly would consist of activating Apollo-like mechanical attachment of upper
stages as subsystems with the necessary integral electro-photonic interconnects to
enable unified GN&C and Communication. Fluid couplings would probably not be
needed to support expendable cargo flights.
Class II.-Pieces in Orbit
Subclass II.A-Large Pieces
Vehicle Design
Assembly of the LTV/LEV and MTV/MEV in this class would represent the closest to a
pure Option I/Option V case. Vehicle elements of the largest possible size consistent
with the ETO transportation system would be integrated. The term "integrate" will be
used rather than "assemble" to denote the putting-together of large, more-or-less stand
alone subsystems.
Each subsystem would be functionally verified on the ground as much as possible,
launched, integrated and then both reverified and end-to-end flight vehicle validated
on-orbit. Thus, the subsystems would require internal self-checking and built-in test
equipment appropriate to that subsystem.
Man Rated vs. Non-Man Rated
The integration and flight certification of non-man rated cargo vehicles would be
somewhat easier than would be the case for man rated.
ETO
The requisite vehicles to support the II.A approach could be drawn from a
larger set than in direct launch. Largest ETO vehicle would be required to bring up the
largest fully loaded subsystem. (In almost all cases, the vehicle dry weight represents
only a small proportion of propellent.) Smaller subsystems could be apportioned to
other available launch vehicles: government, commercial, international, etc., for
maximum access/minimum cost.
On-Orbit Facilities/Operations
Required on-orbit support equipment would be a large scale manipulator, support
structure, and access, via communication link, to ground support verification data
systems, inspection sensors and some minor degree of EVA/IVA support.
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ORU/Mission Success Enhancements
ORU support would be limited to replacement of block subsystems, and hence on-orbit
mission intervention would be possible. Subsystems with least reliability, but
available via orbit-on-demand, could result in significant improvement of end-to-end
mission success probability.
Subclass II.B-Small Pieces
Vehicle Design
In this subclass, the vehicles would consist of a number of (high degree of
commonality) parts that are assembled into the desired combination of Lunar or Mars
transfer vehicles. Considerable interfaces, electrical, fluid, mechanical, would have to
occur. Simple interface design would be at a high premium. Considerable testing
could occur on each small subsystem before launch. On the other hand, with the effort
at simple design to help control on-orbit assembly complexity comes an overhead:
Convenience of interface would imply, possibly in a major way, a lack of efficiency or
compactness of design.
It is also the case that some elements cannot be reduced below a certain point--
propellent being the prime example.
Man Rated vs. Non-Man Rated
In this option the on-orbit assembly of man-rated vehicles and their flight certification
would be the most difficult.
ETO
The Earth-to-Orbit impact of this approach would be very beneficial. Since the
elements are by definition small, virtually any current expendable launch vehicle could
be utilized to carry important parts to orbit. The role of commercial participation could
be expected to grow, particularly in regard to launch vehicles. Considerable cost
savings could occur. However, a considerable "space traffic control" issue might be
encountered. Linking up with a transportation node, virtual or otherwise, would be
straightforward but would require tight coordination.
On-Orbit Facilities/Operations
Facilities impacts for this approach would be the greatest. Not only large space cranes
and rigid holding structures would be needed, but EVA/IVA would be heavily utilized.
Since EVA/IVA could easily be swamped, reliance would have to be placed on
teleoperation and robotics. Many teleoperation activities might mean that ground
operators would be required. Since TDRSS represents a time delay far in excess of
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that tolerable by closed-loop master-slave teleoperation, a low latency ground-to-
space data network might be the only solution. True robotics is virtually non-existent,
mostly at the conceptual stage or at the crudest functional level.
ORU/Mission Success Enhancements
The availability of "bite-sized" on-orbit subsystems (small ORU's) obviously enables
EVA/Telerobotics intervention and implies a considerable enhancement of the
probability of successful launch in the presence of identifiable subsystem malfunction.
In principle, the nursing of the spacecraft up until launch represents a continuation,
and at a lower activity level, of EVNIVA/Telerobotics already in operation.
In addition, the "small pieces"/ORU's approach yields the maximum availability of
available launch services, world-wide, and multiple second source on the ORU's.
Simple interface design (albeit with the attendant hardware, mass, interface, etc.
overhead) would permit any number of companies to provide (sub)functional
elements, man-rated or otherwise, given the company commitment to space-qualifying
the ORU at the (sub)system level. Inventory, logistics, and launch traffic control would
be more severe than for the large pieces.
Minimizing the Amount of On-Orbit Assembly
In overview of the foregoing, it seems clear that on the one hand the "small pieces" will
overload the available EVA resources. If the infrastructure can be established for
teleoperations (the most effective form of telerobotics and the best hope for near term
application to man rated spacecraft) then the "small pieces" just comes barely into the
realm of believability.
At the other extreme, the single vehicle approach, within the Option V or Option I
scenarios seems equally impractical due to the considerable development required to
create the ETO capability. Moreover, such large ( >120 t Saturn V IMLEO capacity)
and complex vehicles would require levels of ground Verification and Validation that
have never been approached before in space flight. If the Shuttle is any indicator of
expected reliability and adherence to flight schedule at the 20 t to orbit level, the
required 160 t for LTV/LEV would be expected to yield schedule performance
jeopardizing continual Lunar operations. Cargo operations are definitely possible,
consistent with the Option V/Option I Scenarios Lunar Elements, while for even the
cargo vehicle the Mars Scenarios cannot be supported (581 t.)
Thus, minimizing on-orbit operations within the Option V or Option I begins with
rejecting the direct launch of a full sized vehicle. Integrating or assembling vehicles
within the orbital capability of astronauts and telerobotics is consistent with reasonable
expectations for near future ETO capability. Larger vehicle elements require less
operations, but this must be traded against mission reliability enhancement resulting
from an aggressive ORU philosophy and EVA intervention.
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Space Station vs. Alternate Transportation Node
Support facilities (structure, power, thermal rejection) will exist at the Space Station,
including the FTS, the SSRMS, and the MSC. For any but the largest subsystems
integration, all such support will be needed, and it is difficult to see what justification
there would be in a second transportation node when one already exists.
If it is an issue of impact on Space Station of SEI operations, say for example in the
area of materials processing, studies have shown that the SEI operations consist of
considerable periods of inactivity with minimal modification of the Iow-g environment.
Further, if Iow-g materials processing is demonstrated to be what it is hoped, then the
establishment of a true micro-g co-orbiting free-flyer would be a logical solution.
Conclusions
It should be noted that even for the LTV/LEV direct launch possibility the ETO system
based on Shuttle C represents a system with 50 per cent more required IMLEO
capacity than the Saturn V. For the Mars Missions, the required IMLEO ranges from
550 t to over 770 t. Even with the much larger ALS or Eternal Tank-derived vehicles
(up to 250 t IMLEO) some assembly is required, while the reality of such launch
systems is limited to the conjectural.
Thus, it would seem that even to support the more leisurely Option V schedule, let
alone more aggressive schedules from Option I, or other future scenarios, assembly
will be required. It seems difficult to credit the idea of developing a separate
transportation node other than Space Station with its already available power,
thermal, DMS, EVA/IVA/Telerobotics, etc. resources. Issues of interference with
materials processing have been shown to be avoidable. Concern over interference
with science investigations should be balanced with the ease with which the severely
impacted could inexpensively become free-flyers. With this understanding, the issue
becomes more of a "mix-or-match" between the "small pieces in orbit" and the "large
pieces in orbit" approaches.
The smaller the pieces (ORU's) the more opportunities for constructive mission
intervention and the broader range of support sources (commercial second source,
commercial-international launch services) at the expense of cost and complexity of on-
orbit operations. The larger the pieces, the less on orbit operations, but less
opportunity for diverse launch services, second sources, or constructive intervention or
spares.
At this stage in architecture development, the trade studies necessary to generate
discriminators on the optimum set or size of ORU's are at a granularity unwarranted by
the maturity of the architectures.
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